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Many epidemics consist in individuals spreading infection to others. From the population 
perspective, they also have population characteristics important in modeling, explaining and 
intervening in epidemics. I analyze epidemiology’s contemporary population perspective through 
the example of epidemics by examining two central principles attributed to Geoffrey Rose: a 
distinction between the causes of cases and the causes of incidence, and between ‘high-risk’ and 
‘population’ strategies of prevention. Both principles require revision or clarification to capture 
the sense in which they describe distinct perspectives on the same phenomenon (such as an 
epidemic), each perspective capturing a different level of contrastive analysis. 
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Epidemics – widespread outbreaks of infectious disease – have visited human societies 
throughout their history. As long as they have occurred, people have sought to make sense of 
them. Such understandings often adopted a population perspective, understanding epidemics as 
afflictions of civilizations due to factors affecting the population as a whole, be it cosmos or 
climate (Rosenberg 1992). Epidemics can seem to have a collective life of their own, above and 
beyond the individual cases of illness of which they are constituted – a pathology of the 
population. 
 Epidemiology as a discipline rose in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries largely 
to study epidemics with new numerical methods. Epidemiology is typically defined as a science 
of populations (Krieger 2011), thus reinforcing the idea that epidemics – historically, the 
epidemiologist’s bread and butter – are best viewed through a population lens. However, from 
the second half of the nineteenth century, the population perspective on epidemics has been in 
tension with the now dominant understanding of infectious diseases as illnesses caused by germs 
(Rosenberg 1992), small pathogens infecting individual bodies. Moreover, according to some 
epidemiologists (e.g. Pearce 1996; Krieger 2011), since the middle of the twentieth century the 
epidemiological gaze generally has become fixed on individuals and the causes of their disease, 
especially with the growth of noncommunicable disease epidemiology. Over the past several 
decades, dissatisfaction with this conception of epidemiology has spurred a revival of interest in 
the population perspective, driven in part by population health scientists who study health and 




 Some of the conceptual groundwork for the revived population perspective was laid by 
the epidemiologist Geoffrey Rose (1985, 1992). In the present paper, I will examine two of 
Rose’s influential principles. The first principle is that the causes of individual cases of disease 
are different than the causes of the incidence of disease in a population. The second is that a 
‘population strategy’ in which one intervenes at a population level is often more effective in 
prevention than a ‘high-risk strategy’ in which one intervenes to prevent disease in highly 
susceptible individuals. These two ideas are central to Rose’s population perspective. I will 
analyze these claims as applied to an epidemic, using the example of the coronavirus disease 
2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. Part of the difficulty in making sense of Rose’s principles is that a 
population is composed of individuals and an epidemic is made up of infections. Therefore, in 
what sense (if any) are the causes of infectious disease distinct from the causes of the incidence 
of infectious disease in an epidemic? And can we sharply distinguish between a strategy of 
intervening in an epidemic and one of intervening in instances of infectious disease? 
 Rose’s principles require clarification or revision. In section 2, I will introduce Rose’s 
population perspective, focusing on his two central principles. In section 3, I will provide some 
scientific background on epidemics. Then in section 4, I will argue that Rose’s distinction 
between the causes of cases and the causes of incidence should be understood in terms of 
different levels of contrastive causal explanation; and in section 5, I will argue that the 
population strategy should be given a corresponding contrastive interpretation. As its name 
would suggest, the population perspective offers a particular perspective on epidemics, viewing 






2. The population perspective 
 
Epidemiology is often defined as the study of the distribution and determinants of health and 
disease in populations (Krieger 2011). It may seem odd to suggest that epidemiological research 
could ever lack a population perspective. However, over the past few decades, several 
epidemiologists have articulated concerns about an individualistic approach in mainstream 
epidemiology and have advocated for a more population-oriented approach. 
 For example, Neil Pearce (1996) argues that in contrast to the traditional approach to 
epidemiology of the nineteenth century that investigated the social and environmental conditions 
leading to poor health in populations, modern epidemiology has embraced a “reductionist 
approach [that] focuses on the individual” (678) and he implores epidemiologists to “rediscover 
the population perspective” (682) lost in recent decades by investigating the causes of disease in 
populations. Similarly, Nancy Krieger (2011) argues that the dominant individualistic approach 
to epidemiological theorizing since the mid-twentieth century, the ‘biomedical model’, “views 
populations simply as the sum of individuals and population patterns of disease as simply 
reflective of individual cases” (137). 
In recent decades, the field of ‘population health science’ has arisen to reorient public 
health by studying patterns of health within and between populations (Valles 2018). In their 
textbook Population Health Science, Katherine Keyes and Sandro Galea write: “Population 
health science is the study of the conditions that shape distributions of health within and across 
populations, and of the mechanisms through which these conditions manifest in the health of 
individuals” (2016, 1). Keyes and Galea distinguish conditions affecting health at the population 




 Much of the conceptual grounding for the resurgent population perspective in 
epidemiology was set down by Rose. In a 1985 paper titled “Sick Individuals and Sick 
Populations”, Rose proposed several radical ideas, later extended in his 1992 book The Strategy 
of Preventive Medicine. Rather than examining the population perspective directly, I will focus 
on two of Rose’s principles, which are central to his population perspective. The foundations of 
the population perspective have been further developed by Rose’s contemporaries and successors 
(Keyes and Galea (2016) consider Rose to be the founder of population heath science). I will 
introduce Rose’s two ideas briefly here. In sections 4 and 5, I will analyze them by applying 
them to the epidemiology of epidemics.  
 Rose’s first principle is that the causes of individual cases of disease differ from the 
causes of the incidence of disease (the number of new cases per unit time1) or the causes of the 
mean value of a risk factor in a population. Rose: “I find it increasingly helpful to distinguish 
two kinds of aetiological question. The first seeks the causes of cases, and the second seeks the 
causes of incidence” (2001, 428). Put differently, Rose claims that the causes of differences in 
cases within populations are typically distinct from the causes of differences in incidence 
between populations. For instance, he suggests that variation in genetic causes tends to be much 
greater among individuals within a population, while variation in environmental causes tends to 
be much greater between two populations. In his Intersalt study of 32 countries (Intersalt 
Cooperative Research Group 1988), Rose found that the curve representing the distribution of 
blood pressure values in a population had a similar shape across countries but varied in its 
                                                          
1 I will use this definition of the incidence throughout the paper. A related measure is the ‘incidence proportion’ or 





placement along the horizontal blood pressure axis, and thus the mean blood pressure varied too. 
Rose (2008) suggested that these horizontal shifts in population distribution “manifestly reflect 
characteristics of populations and not characteristics of individuals” (2008, 92). 
 Rose’s second principle is that a ‘population strategy’ in which one intervenes at a 
population level is often more effective in prevention than a ‘high-risk strategy’ in which one 
intervenes to prevent disease in highly susceptible (high-risk) individuals. The two approaches 
map onto Rose’s distinction between causes of cases versus causes of incidence: “These two 
approaches to aetiology—the individual and the population-based—have their counterparts in 
prevention. In the first, preventive strategy seeks to identify high-risk susceptible individuals and 
to offer them some individual protection. In contrast, the ‘population strategy’ seeks to control 
the determinants of incidence in the population as a whole” (2001, 429). Thus, the high-risk 
strategy controls causes in individuals (e.g. cholesterol or blood pressure) and truncates the risk 
distribution, changing its shape. Meanwhile, the population strategy controls determinants of 
population health such as environmental or societal factors and shifts the entire population 
distribution, changing its incidence or mean without necessarily changing the shape of the curve. 
In summary, there are two conceptual components of Rose’s population perspective: a 
population perspective on etiology and a population perspective on intervention. Rose fleshes out 
each component by way of a comparison with a more individualistic perspective on etiology and 
a more individualistic perspective on intervention, respectively. I will argue that Rose’s 
population perspectives on etiology and intervention go hand-in-hand. 
 A major philosophical difficulty with each of Rose’s claims is that each sharply 
distinguishes populations (and their causes and prevention) from individuals (and their causes 




ontologically reducible to a collection of interacting individuals. At least that seems to be the 
case with epidemiologic populations as epidemiologists and population health scientists usually 
conceive of them. For instance, Keyes and Galea write, “Typically, we think of populations as 
collections of people or other organisms that share common characteristics, most often a specific 
location they inhabit” (2016, 4). Thus, without clarification or revision, Rose’s population 
perspective risks being incoherent or saddling epidemiology with excess metaphysical baggage. 
As with most of the preventive medicine literature, the main diseases Rose had in mind 
were noncommunicable. However, the importance of the population perspective on epidemics 
has not been completely overlooked within epidemiology. Khaw and Marmot list herd immunity, 
an important idea in the science of epidemics, among three examples that “requires us to go 
beyond the level of the individual” (2008, 18). Pearce claims that “analysis at the individual level 
cannot explain epidemic spread at the group level and cannot even fully explain the spread of 
infections between individuals” (1996, 682). And Galea and Keyes (2020) examine the COVID-
19 pandemic through a population health science perspective. 
I will analyze the population perspective in sections 4 and 5 through the example of 
infectious disease epidemics. I will do so indirectly by examining Rose’s distinctions between 
the causes of cases and causes of incidence (section 4), and the high-risk and population 
strategies for prevention (section 5). First, I will introduce some of the contemporary science of 
epidemics. 
 





An epidemic is an increase within a large geographical area in the number of cases of a disease 
above the normal baseline. When an epidemic spreads to several countries and affects a great 
number of people, it becomes a pandemic (CDC 2012). Although ‘epidemic’ and ‘pandemic’ are 
sometimes used to describe a noncommunicable disease or health state like obesity, here I will 
use these terms to refer only to infectious diseases. In these cases, epidemics are due to infectious 
spread of a pathogen, usually a virus, bacterium or parasite. Epidemics may be common-source 
or propagated (CDC 2012). In a common source epidemic, infections result from exposure to the 
same source, such as a contaminated food or water supply. In a propagated epidemic, infections 
spread from person to person. Once a human population has been seeded with the initial 
infections, a propagated epidemic starts to grow as the pathogen spreads to a greater number of 
people with each successive cycle or ‘generation’ of infections. 
Many health sciences (and social sciences) are relevant to the scientific understanding of 
epidemics, including microbiology, immunology and infectious disease epidemiology. 
Epidemiologists describe, explain and predict the spread of an epidemic and predict and evaluate 
the effect of interventions to counteract the epidemic. These tasks are greatly aided by the use of 
epidemic models, a family of mathematical models that model the dynamics of an epidemic. 
Two kinds of epidemic models are often used: microsimulation models and compartment models 
(Vynnycky & White 2010). Microsimulation or individual-based models are computer 
simulation models of an epidemic in a large population (with hundreds, thousands or even 
millions of individuals); they model the contacts and health states of each member of the 
population individually. 
In contrast, much of the focus of discussion in the rest of this paper will involve 




subgroups or ‘compartments’ of the population as an epidemic evolves. Compartment models 
can be fully deterministic, or they can have stochastic elements. In an SIR model, the population 
is partitioned into three compartments: one for individuals who are susceptible to infection at 
time t, one for individuals who are infectious to others at t, and one for individuals who are 
recovered from and/or are immune from infection (or who have died) at t. There are many 
variations on this model (Vynnycky & White 2010). 
We will consider a variation in which newly infected individuals transition through a pre-
infectious or ‘exposed’ compartment E before they become infectious: a SEIR model. Figure 1 
provides a schematic of the flow of individuals through the compartments of a SEIR model.  
 
 
Figure 1. Structure of a simple SEIR model. Assuming random or homogeneous mixing of all 
members of the population, λ(t) = βI(t). From Vynnycky & White (2010), An Introduction to 
Infectious Disease Modelling. © Oxford University Press. Reproduced with permission of the 
Licensor through PLSclear. 
 
 Compartment models usually take the form of a system of ordinary differential equations 
(though difference equations are sometimes used instead). A simple deterministic SEIR model of 
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More complicated models are produced by building in stochasticity or stratifying the population 
into segments with unique parameters. S(t), E(t), I(t) and R(t) are the number of individuals in the 
susceptible, pre-infectious, infectious and recovered compartments, respectively. β is the 
effective contact rate, the rate at which an infectious individual contacts a susceptible individual 
and transmits infection to them. f is the rate at which a pre-infectious individual becomes 
infectious. Finally, r is the rate at which an infectious individual recovers. Neither β, f, nor r is a 
constant; they can vary depending on the pathogen and the population. For example, β will tend 
to be greater in crowded areas and for diseases in which a greater number of individual 
pathogens are shed by each infectious person; and r will tend to be smaller in populations that 
lack curative treatment and for diseases that have a long natural duration of infectiousness. 
 An important parameter in describing epidemics is the reproduction number. The basic 
reproduction number R0 is the average number of secondary infectious individuals resulting from 
an initial infectious individual in an otherwise completely susceptible population. It can be 




infection has spread and the susceptible compartment has begun to be depleted, the effective or 
net reproduction number Rn describes the average number of secondary infections resulting from 
an infectious individual as the epidemic evolves. It is calculated using the equation Rn = R0 s, 
where s is the proportion of the population that is susceptible. When Rn is greater than 1, the 
number of new infectious individuals is growing as each infectious individual transmits infection 
to more than one susceptible individual on average. When Rn is equal to 1, the number of new 
infectious individuals is unchanging. When Rn is less than 1, the number of new infectious 
individuals is shrinking. Simple deterministic SIR or SEIR models generate a set of epidemic 
curves with a classic shape (Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2. Epidemic curves predicted by a deterministic SEIR model with the following 
parameters. Total population N (all susceptible at start) = 100,000, β = 0.00001, f = 0.5, r = 0.5, 
R0 = 2. From Vynnycky & White (2010), An Introduction to Infectious Disease Modelling. © 
Oxford University Press. Reproduced with permission of the Licensor through PLSclear. 
 
In examining the population perspective on epidemics, I will use as my running example 




responsible pathogen is severe acute respiratory disease coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), a novel 
human coronavirus (Andersen et al. 2020). SARS-CoV-2 is transmitted primarily through 
respiratory droplets or aerosols that are produced by coughing, sneezing, singing or talking. At 
the time of writing, the CDC’s best estimate for SARS-CoV-2’s R0 is 2.5 (CDC 2020). Many 
SARS-CoV-2 infections in humans are asymptomatic, but others result in the disease COVID-
19, which has a wide spectrum of severity from mild respiratory symptoms to severe pneumonia 
requiring respiratory support, including mechanical ventilation. From Wuhan in December 2019, 
the epidemic spread to the rest of China and worldwide. On 11 March 2020, the WHO declared a 
pandemic. 
Many epidemic models have been used to project the growth of the pandemic and the 
potential for non-pharmaceutical strategies to mitigate it. In March 2020, modelers at the MRC 
Centre for Global Infectious Disease Analysis at Imperial College London used a 
microsimulation model to project the evolution of the epidemics in the U.S. and the U.K. and the 
influence of strategies to reduce person-to-person contact (Ferguson et al. 2020). That same 
month, they used a SEIR model to extend their analysis to 200 other countries (Walker et al. 
2020). The latter model projected 7.0 billion infections and 40 million deaths worldwide in an 
unmitigated pandemic, but that an early transmission suppression strategy could save 38.7 
million lives. It was partly on the basis of epidemic model projections that countries around the 
world introduced ‘lockdown’ measures (including government stay-at-home orders) and social 
distancing policies. 
 Having introduced some of the science of epidemics, I will now examine the population 
perspective on epidemics, beginning with the etiology of an epidemic. How should we 





4. Epidemics and infections have distinct explanations 
 
The first central principle underlying Rose’s (1985, 1992) population perspective is his dictum 
that the causes of cases are different than the causes of incidence – in an epidemic, the causes of 
cases of infectious disease are different from the causes of incidence of infectious disease. This 
slogan requires revision but leads us to an important point about explaining epidemics. 
 On a literal ontic construal, Rose’s distinction between the causes of cases and the causes 
of incidence is not as sharp as Rose intends. In an epidemic, we can see this quite clearly by 
focusing on the cause that all cases of the epidemic disease share: a specific pathogen. For 
instance, all cases of COVID-19 are caused by SARS-CoV-2. The incidence of a disease is an 
aggregate measure of the number of cases. So, an incidence of, say, one million in the pandemic 
represents one million cases of COVID-19. Each of these cases is caused by SARS-CoV-2. 
Therefore, an incidence of one million cases is caused by SARS-CoV-2 in the sense that:  
C1→E1 , C2→E2 ,… C1,000,000→E1,000,000 .  
Each E is a token case of COVID-19, each C is a token SARS-CoV-2 infection, and the arrows 
represent the relation ‘caused’. The causes responsible for the incidence of COVID-19 are the 
same as the causes responsible for the cases of COVID-19 because the incidence aggregates over 
the cases. 
 This result is not an artifact of the COVID-19 example generated by the feature that – 
like other infectious diseases – COVID-19 has a universal infectious cause, one that is common 
to each case and necessary for the occurrence of a case of that disease type (Broadbent 2013; 




conjunction of causes for each case, where every conjunction may or not share the same salient 
universal cause. Then, the ‘complete causes’ of one million cases can be represented as:  
C1,1 ∙ C2,1 ∙ …→E1 , C1,2 ∙ C2,2 ∙ …→E2 ,… C1,1,000,000 ∙ C2,1,000,000 ∙ …→E1,000,000 .  
Here again, the causes responsible for the incidence are the same as the causes responsible for 
the cases. The causes of the incidence are contained within this list of the causes of the cases. 
Imagine that a new token complete cause was introduced that increased the incidence to 
1,000,001. Based on the definition of the incidence, this change in incidence must be 
accompanied by a change in the number of cases: one new case must have occurred. This new 
case must have had some causes because a case of disease is not the kind of thing that occurs 
uncaused. However, according to my construction of this scenario, the only new causes are the 
ones responsible for the change in incidence. Thus, any causes responsible for a change in 
incidence must also be responsible for new cases. It could be that the causes of the cases are re-
described when talking about the causes of the incidence, but this re-description refers to the 
same actual worldly causes. 
 One promising way of interpreting ‘the causes of incidence’ is as selecting certain salient 
causes from among the causes of the cases. What criterion of causal selection might Rose have in 
mind? One candidate would be a cause that appears in all or most of the complete causes of the 
cases: in our example, SARS-CoV-2. However, other examples may lack such a universal cause, 
especially the noncommunicable diseases in which Rose was especially interested. 
 Another way that Rose (1985, 1992) framed his distinction is that the causes of 
differences in outcomes within a population are typically different compared to the causes of 
differences in incidence between two populations. For instance, he claims that genetic factors are 




responsible for variation between populations. These claims, taken as empirical generalizations, 
fail to hold in the example of an epidemic because a specific environmental pathogen is a cause 
of all differences in occurrence of disease both within and between populations. However, if we 
understand Rose’s distinction differently, then we can salvage a deeper generalization, one that is 
primarily epistemic rather than an empirical statement about the kinds of worldly factors that 
cause the cases versus the incidence. 
 Instead of a difference between the causes of cases and the causes of incidence, Rose’s 
distinction is better understood as a difference between the causal explanation for cases and the 
causal explanation for the incidence. In a few places, Rose approaches the latter distinction: “I 
find it increasingly helpful to distinguish two kinds of aetiological question. The first seeks the 
causes of cases, and the second seeks the causes of incidence. ‘Why do some individuals have 
hypertension?’ is a quite different question from ‘Why do some populations have much 
hypertension, whilst in others it is rare?’” (2001, 428). As Valles argues (2018), these two 
different why-questions demand different types of causal explanation in answer: the former 
asking for an explanatory difference between hypertensive and non-hypertensive individuals, and 
the latter asking for an explanatory difference between high incidence and low incidence 
populations. However, in what ways does the latter explanation differ from the former? Before 
offering an answer, let us first consider what these two kinds of explanation have in common. 
 Both questions seek a cause that explains the contrast in question. They thus call for a 
contrastive causal explanation. For instance, drawing on Peter Lipton’s (2004) model of 
contrastive causal explanation, an answer to Rose’s first question will cite a cause of 
hypertension in some individuals that is absent from (actual) contrasting non-hypertensive 




hypertension in some populations that differs in (actual) contrasting populations that have a 
lower incidence.2 
Alex Broadbent (2013) similarly makes contrastive causal explanation a central pillar in 
his account of causation in epidemiology and argues that not enough attention has been given to 
explanation by epidemiologists. A contrastive causal model of explanation suits epidemiology 
well because epidemiology is consumed with contrastive causal analysis, whether comparing 
cases to controls, different population cohorts with one another, or clinical trial groups. We don’t 
have to assume that a contrastive model exhausts all the kinds of explanations that are sought 
after in epidemiology, but the model does capture many of them. It is also compatible with one 
of Rose’s (1985, 1992) main concerns in drawing attention to the causes of incidence, which was 
to account for differences when comparing populations. In fact, it provides a useful causal 
selection criterion for the causes of incidence: ‘the cause’ of the incidence is that cause (or 
causes) which explain(s) the relevant population contrast. 
 To illustrate the contrastive model, take the question ‘Why did these individuals develop 
COVID-19?’. If the questioner is an epidemiologist trying to identify the cause of a new 
syndrome in Wuhan at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, the relevant contrast class 
contains individuals without COVID-19 symptoms (‘controls’), and a good answer would cite an 
exposure common to all the cases of COVID-19 and absent from the controls (i.e. SARS-CoV-
2). If instead a doctor wanted to understand why some individuals infected with SARS-CoV-2 
develop symptomatic COVID-19 while others do not, the relevant contrast is people infected 
                                                          
2 On contrastive accounts of causation (e.g. Schaffer 2005), causal claims (e.g. ‘a high salt diet caused their 
hypertension’) are themselves (often implicitly) contrastive. A contrastive causal explanation is not necessarily 
committed to a contrastive interpretation of causal claims. However, even if one held a contrastive view of causal 
claims, that would not dissolve my distinction between causes of cases (incidence) and contrastive explanations for 
cases (incidence) or render the distinction trivial or uninteresting by somehow making the causes of cases also 
contrastive because by ‘causes of cases’ I mean those features of the world that are represented in causal claims 




with SARS-CoV-2 who did not develop symptomatic COVID-19, and a good answer would 
identify viral or physiologic determinants of disease pathology (such as the body’s inflammatory 
response).  
 Now take a question suggested by Galea and Keyes (2020): ‘Why was the incidence of 
COVID-19 increasing in Florida in June 2020?’. Their explicit contrast is Massachusetts, in 
which the incidence of COVID-19 was decreasing in June 2020. Unlike the previous question, 
this why-question seeks an explanation for the incidence, not an explanation for the cases. A 
why-question about the incidence (as opposed to a why-question about the cases) treats the 
incidence as the fact to be explained rather than any of the specific cases into which the 
incidence can be decomposed. The relevant contrast is not between a set of specific cases of 
COVID-19 and a set of specific controls, but rather between two populations that vary in terms 
of a population characteristic: namely, the incidence. The relevant explanation will cite other 
population characteristic(s) that differed between the two populations. 
By ‘population characteristic’3, I mean a feature that is described at the level of the 
population as a whole – whether that feature is internal or external to the population’s individuals 
– and does not necessarily apply to a specific individual member of that population. For instance, 
the incidence is a characteristic of a population rather than an individual. So are the parameters 
of an epidemic model such as β, the effective contact rate. A population characteristic often 
aggregates, averages or otherwise abstracts over individual-level characteristics: the incidence 
aggregates over cases of disease, while β abstracts over individual disease transmission events. A 
relevant explanation for a population characteristic will cite another population characteristic that 
                                                          
3 I use the term ‘characteristic’ rather than ‘property’ to remain noncommittal about whether these characteristics are 




was causally responsible for the difference between the two populations. A relevant explanatory 
population characteristic might be something that we simply cannot attribute to a specific 
individual or their context; for instance, it would be a category mistake to attribute β, as a rate, to 
an individual contact event. However, sometimes a relevant population characteristic could 
equally describe a specific individual, as when it refers to a universal or ubiquitous individual 
exposure that we could reasonably say is also an exposure for the population as a whole. One of 
Rose’s (1985) examples was the hardness of a population’s water supply, which we can say is an 
exposure for the population by virtue of the fact that is an exposure for all or most individuals in 
that population. However, in the previous example of an increasing incidence of COVID-19, 
SARS-CoV-2 is not a population characteristic because the entire population is not (as a matter 
of fact) exposed to SARS-CoV-2, and thus SARS-CoV-2 does not provide an explanation for the 
difference in incidence. 
When a population characteristic is a universal or ubiquitous exposure for individuals in a 
population (and absent from a contrasting population), it cannot explain case-control contrasts 
within the exposed population. A hard water supply might explain why the first population has a 
higher incidence of disease but it cannot explain why certain individuals in that population have 
the disease compared to others who lack the disease because – as a universal exposure – water 
hardness is not a difference between the cases and the controls. (This phenomenon greatly 
worried Rose: a case-control study done in the universally exposed population would fail to 




unexposed controls4.) However, when an explanatory population variable abstracts away from 
individuals as does β, it could be that some cause – in this case, infection transmission – is cited 
by individual explanations as well. Infection transmission represented by β will explain a higher 
incidence of COVID-19, while infection transmission represented at the level of particular 
SARS-CoV-2 transmission events will explain individual cases of COVID-19. So, as a general 
principle it is not always true that the causes represented in explanations for the incidence are 
different from the causes represented in explanations for the cases. 
Instead, Rose’s claim should be rephrased to read: contrastive explanations for the 
incidence are distinct from contrastive explanations for the cases. By ‘explanation’, I am 
referring here to a fully articulated proposition (the explanans). My claim should be read as a 
statement about the explanans as a proposition rather than the worldly causes cited in the 
explanans, which are not always distinct (as I just pointed out). In specifying that the explanation 
is fully articulated, I also wish to preclude shorthand expressions like ‘Because the tap water is 
hard’. It might seem as though this expression could explain a difference in incidence or a 
difference in cases, but it really stands in for some more fully articulated explanation such as 
‘Because the tap water in Akron is hard while the tap water in Seattle is not’ or ‘Because Ramesh 
drinks hard tap water while Vlada does not’. Not only do I want to claim that particular 
contrastive explanations for the incidence are distinct from particular contrastive explanations 
for its constitutive cases; but also, contrastive explanations for the incidence are different in kind 
in that they typically describe population characteristics in both explanandum and explanans, and 
                                                          
4 To further illustrate this idea, a study comparing lit and unlit firewood seeking to identify the causes of firewood 
lighting that was conducted entirely outdoors would fail to uncover the causal role of oxygen because exposure to 




thus explain phenomena at a different level of decomposition compared to explanations for 
cases. 
One might wonder just how distinct explanations for the incidence and explanations for 
the cases really are given that the incidence aggregates over cases. In fact, Broadbent (2013) 
proposes that to explain a difference n in aggregate outcome between two epidemiological 
groups is to cite a difference in the level of an exposure that caused at least n cases of the 
outcome in the group with greater exposure. For example, to explain why one population had a 
10,000 greater incidence of COVID-19 compared to a second population, we would cite a cause 
of at least 10,000 cases of COVID-19 in the first population that was absent from the second 
population. Broadbent’s interpretation of aggregate epidemiologic outcomes is plausible. Using 
his interpretation, is this explanation for the COVID-19 incidence not also an explanation for the 
cases? In my sense it is not, in that it does not explain specific cases of COVID-19. It explains 
why some individuals contracted COVID-19 while others did not, but not why particular 
individuals contracted COVID-19. It could be that the incidence in the population is 1,000,000, 
and therefore the cause that explained some 10,000 of those cases (and thus explained the 
difference in incidence) does not explain the other 990,000.  
This epistemic difficulty of identifying the specific individuals affected is also one reason 
why an explanation for the incidence must typically cite a population characteristic rather than a 
collection of specific individual-level causes. Assume that relaxed social distancing policies 
caused exactly 10,000 COVID-19 cases in the population with an incidence of 1,000,000. In 
principle, if we knew which 10,000 cases were caused by the new policies, we could list these 
specific causings, which would indeed account for the difference in incidence (bar re-openings 




COVID-19, and so on). In practice, we can typically do no better than list the net difference in 
incidence explained by a population-wide difference (in this case, in social distancing policies). 
Moreover, there are reasons to think that an incidence explanation describing a 
population characteristic is more explanatory for an epidemiologist or public health authority 
than an explanation citing specific individual-level causings, at least sometimes. For one thing, 
an epidemiologist is often interested in general relationships (Broadbent 2013), those that apply 
to other contexts (e.g. relaxing social distancing too quickly causes a spike in cases), rather than 
unique happenings (e.g. Abe going to the local pub caused him to contract infection), and 
population characteristics that abstract away from individuals are more likely to participate in 
general relationships because they are multiply realized (it makes no difference to the incidence 
if Abe was infected rather than Abby). Moreover, population characteristics often give public 
health authorities a handle for the purposes of intervening (e.g. by changing social distancing 
policies), a pragmatic virtue of these explanations. As we will see, Rose’s ‘population strategy’ 
for intervention dovetails with his ‘causes of incidence’. 
Applied to epidemics, we can translate my principle to read that epidemics and infections 
have distinct contrastive explanations, with all my previous clarifications in place. Epidemic 
explanations explain population characteristics like the incidence, while infection explanations 
explain individual characteristics like infection. 
For example, an answer to the question ‘Why was the incidence of COVID-19 increasing 
in Florida in June 2020 (while in Massachusetts it was decreasing)?’ could use a compartment 
model to help satisfy the inquiry. The incidence of COVID-19 is driven by the rate of new 
infections, which is given by βI(t)S(t) (see equation 2 from section 3). With an immunizing 




increases in the rate of infection are driven by increases in the number of infectious individuals 
I(t) and/or in β. Galea and Keyes (2020) suggest one plausible reason why the incidence was 
increasing in Florida but not Massachusetts: due to quickly loosened social distancing policies 
and relaxed adherence to social distancing guidelines in Florida (which would account for a 
higher β in Florida). For the sake of illustration, a different (currently unsupported) explanation 
for the difference in β would point to a mutant strain of the virus present in Florida but absent in 
Massachusetts with more efficient viral attachment to the body’s ACE2 receptor. In comparison, 
an explanation for the large number of cases of COVID-19 in assisted-living facilities in either 
state (compared to controls living elsewhere) might refer to differences in the presence of serious 
comorbid conditions and in social contact patterns (Galea and Keyes 2020). 
A compartment model can often provide a relevant epidemic explanation or contribute to 
a relevant explanation because the parameters in a compartment model represent population 
characteristics. Compartment model equations relate the rate of change in a population 
compartment to the size of that compartment and to other population characteristics like β. A 
compartment model thus shows how differences in this rate depend on differences in other 
population parameters.5 On the other hand, a microsimulation model might fail to deliver 
relevant epidemic explanations despite the fact that a compartment model and a microsimulation 
model can be used to model the exact same epidemic (such was the case with the two models 
                                                          
5 The idea that compartment models capture difference-making relationships justifies my claim that they provide or 
contribute to causal explanations. Here I will follow Meyer (2020), who argues that dynamical models provide 
causal explanations when their variables satisfy Woodward’s (2003) manipulability criterion for causal relevance. 
Compartment models are often treated by modelers as if they do, as when modelers predict the causal effectiveness 
of interventions by manipulating a model parameter and quantifying the effect on cumulative infections (Walker et 
al. 2020). One might worry that this example shows only that compartment models are predictive causal models 
rather than explanatory. After all, compartment models are typically used to make ‘projections’ (Adams 2020). 




= 𝑦’). These conditionals can be used to causally explain the past and not only to causally predict the 
future because they are agnostic as to whether 
𝑑𝐸(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡




used by the Imperial College team to predict the spread of COVID-19 in the U.K. and the U.S. 
(Ferguson et al. 2020; Walker et al. 2020)). The reason that a microsimulation model might fail 
is not because it leaves out the causes of the incidence. A microsimulation model does model the 
causes of the incidence, just with less abstraction: for instance, rather than representing infection 
transmission on average with β, it represents infection transmission events individually. The 
reason it might fail to deliver relevant epidemic explanations is precisely because it models 
interactions among individuals rather than modeling population characteristics, thus missing the 
epidemic for the trees. 
 Other distinctions –between reductive and non-reductive explanations, or between 
biological and social explanations – fail to reliably distinguish epidemic explanations from 
infection explanations. For example, a relevant explanation for the incidence citing policies 
around social distancing could reasonably be described as ‘non-reductive’ because it refers to 
societal-level policies as well as ‘social’ because it refers to social behavior. Meanwhile, a 
different but no less relevant explanation for the incidence citing a new dominant viral strain 
could be described as ‘reductive’ because it refers to an entity at a sub-population level as well as 
‘biological’ because viruses are objects of biological research. 
 The distinction between epidemic explanations and infection explanations is in the first 
place about different levels of contrastive causal explanation. As its name suggests, the 
population perspective on the causes of an epidemic differs from the individual perspective in 
perspective. ‘Epidemic causes’ and ‘infection causes’ are often two perspectives on the same 
perspective-independent thing.6 An infection explanation decomposes an epidemic into its cases 
and explains individual cases (perhaps using biological models of disease), while an epidemic 
                                                          




explanation regards the population afflicted with the epidemic as the unit of analysis and 
explains its population characteristics (perhaps using a compartment model). These perspectives 
offer complementary rather than competing explanations, differing in how they characterize an 
epidemic and its causes. We do not need to posit additional causes for the incidence on top of the 
causes of the cases. Moreover, the particular causes that an epidemic explanation selects might 
be the same causes represented in an infection explanation. 
 The first core presupposition of the population perspective on epidemics is that the causes 
of cases in an epidemic are different than the causes of incidence. On a literal construal, the 
claim is false because the incidence aggregates over the cases. An improved restatement of the 
idea is that contrastive explanations for the incidence are distinct from contrastive explanations 
for the cases. Applied to an epidemic, epidemics and infections have distinct contrastive 
explanations, the former explanations describing characteristics of epidemic populations and the 
latter describing characteristics of particular infected individuals. I will now show how epidemic 
explanations play an important role in the population strategy of intervention. 
 
5. The population strategy for epidemics: targeting dynamical population parameters 
 
The second central principle underlying Rose’s (1985, 1992) population perspective is his 
distinction between ‘high-risk’ and ‘population’ strategies for prevention. In an epidemic, the 
former would protect those at high risk for infection or complications of infection while the latter 
would protect the population. I will argue that the distinction is not about targeting different 




 In the high-risk strategy for prevention, preventive interventions are targeted at 
individuals who are at high risk of some bad outcome. Rose identifies this strategy as the 
approach of clinical medicine. For an individual with high blood pressure at high risk of a heart 
attack or stroke, an antihypertensive is provided that may prevent that individual from having a 
heart attack or stroke. These interventions are often viewed as ‘lowering the patient’s risk’. I will 
set aside questions about the meaning of the patient’s individual risk and whether medical 
interventions are best understood in this way (but see Fuller 2020). The important feature of the 
high-risk approach for our purposes is that interventions target individuals. 
The main consideration Rose puts forward in favor of the population strategy is “one of 
the most fundamental axioms in preventive medicine: a large number of people exposed to a 
small risk may generate many more cases than a small number exposed to a high risk” (2008, 
59), and so there may be more cases to prevent for a population strategy compared with a high-
risk strategy. Rose’s ‘fundamental axiom’ follows from the mathematics of the ‘absolute risk’ in 
epidemiology: the number of cases is equal to the product of the absolute risk (the proportion of 
the population that is diseased) and the size of the population; thus, a smaller risk may generate 
more cases if the population is larger. 
Rose describes a corollary that he calls the ‘prevention paradox’: “A preventive measure 
which brings much benefit to the population offers little to each participating individual” (2001, 
432). In the population strategy, the incidence (total number of cases) may be greatly reduced, 
while the population’s individuals generally experience little benefit because their risk is small. 
Although not a logical paradox, this idea seems strange when cast as pitting individual benefit 




However, one way of interpreting the population strategy is as a strategy of intervening in 
the health states of all individuals in the population, or of those individuals who are not in the 
high-risk subgroup. Stephen John seems to understand the population strategy in this way, as 
“targeting the (many) members of moderate- or low-risk groups” (2011, 250). John thus 
interprets Rose’s prevention paradox as trading between two different senses of ‘benefit’: benefit 
as a reduction in individual risk of harm, and benefit as prevention of realized individual harm. 
The population strategy may benefit a greater number of individuals than the high-risk strategy 
in the sense of preventing a greater number of cases of realized harm, while bringing less benefit 
to each individual in the sense of reducing their individual risk by a smaller amount. Understood 
in this way, the population strategy for intervention is a variation on the high-risk strategy that 
targets individuals at lower risk, rather than a genuine population perspective on prevention in 
any meaningful sense. 
Yet Rose (1985) portrays his fundamental axiom as merely one motivation for the 
population strategy rather than as describing the target of intervention in the population strategy. 
Rather than lower-risk individuals, the target of intervention in Rose’s population strategy is the 
population incidence: “These two approaches to aetiology—the individual and the population-
based—have their counterparts in prevention. In the first, preventive strategy seeks to identify 
high-risk susceptible individuals and to offer them some individual protection. In contrast, the 
‘population strategy’ seeks to control the determinants of incidence in the population as a whole” 
(Rose 2001, 429). Rose’s population strategy involves targeting the ‘causes of incidence’. In the 
previous section, I argued that we should understand the ‘causes of incidence’ as referring to 




strategy for intervention as targeting population characteristics that contrastively explain the 
incidence. 
This interpretation of the population strategy piggybacks on my interpretation of ‘the 
causes of incidence’. In explaining the incidence in a population, we cite a cause of the incidence 
in that population – a population characteristic – that differed in a contrast population with a 
different incidence. The contrast population is usually an actual population, whether a different 
population or the same population at a different time. Similarly, in the population strategy for 
intervention, we target a population characteristic, manipulating its value, in order to produce a 
difference in incidence between two populations. This time, the relevant contrast is a 
counterfactual comparison of the same population under different values for the population 
characteristic. In explaining, we locate a cause responsible for a difference. In intervening, we 
manipulate a cause to produce a difference. This difference can then be explained by citing the 
manipulated cause. 
‘Targeting a population characteristic’ is an intellectual exercise: we conceptualize our 
intervention as manipulating causes that are described as population characteristics, and we 
predict resulting differences in other population characteristics. It is not that interventions 
targeting population characteristics affect only the population without affecting its individuals. 
After all, some of these population characteristics (like the incidence) are mathematically defined 
in terms of individual characteristics (like the presence of disease). Others (like the basic 
reproduction number) are defined in terms of other population characteristics, yet they 
nonetheless supervene on individual characteristics (like individual behavior). In either case, a 
change in the population characteristic will be reflected in changes in individual characteristics. 




mysteriously brought about by some other cause, our population intervention must be 
responsible for them. 
On my interpretation, Rose’s prevention paradox is best seen as a conflict between 
individual benefit and population benefit, rather than as one between the two distinct senses of 
individual benefit that John (2011) proposes. The population strategy often brings little benefit to 
most individuals (whether individual benefit is understood as a small risk reduction or as 
prevention of a realized harm). At the same time, the population strategy often brings much 
benefit to the population in the sense of greatly affecting population characteristics such as the 
incidence. It is beyond the scope of the present paper to probe these concepts of ‘individual 
benefit’ versus ‘population benefit’ (but see John (2014) on the ethics of high-risk versus 
population approaches, and Broadbent (2020) on the prevention paradox and ethical trade-offs in 
COVID-19). Again, the upshot for the population perspective is that the population strategy 
targets population characteristics rather than individual characteristics. 
One might argue that even if the conceptual target of intervention is different in the 
population strategy, practically speaking it involves extending the use of an intervention for 
many individuals beyond the high-risk group. In some examples like blood pressure lowering or 
water fluoridation that may sometimes be true: the population strategy might recommend 
antihypertensives for the many individuals without severe hypertension and fluoride for the 
many individuals who are not at high risk of dental decay. This scenario is readily understood in 
terms of my proposal: an antihypertensive serves as a universal or ubiquitous exposure (an 
exposure for the population as a whole) that targets the mean blood pressure in the population (a 
population characteristic); and this lowered mean blood pressure then explains the lower 




more visual interpretation, the intervention targets and shifts the entire blood pressure 
distribution. 
Moreover, other times the conceptual strategy of targeting population characteristics that 
drive differences in the incidence may recommend different interventions compared to the high-
risk strategy and thus cannot be seen as extending an intervention to many individuals. For 
instance, in controlling an epidemic, the high-risk strategy might recommend reducing contacts 
for those at highest risk of death to prevent them from being infected, while the population 
strategy might recommend banning large gatherings at which infection ‘super-spreading’ events 
may occur in order to reduce the general incidence of infection and prevent deaths that way. The 
population strategy might sometimes even recommend an intervention that is not easily seen as 
aimed at specific individuals at all, such as influencing social norms (Rose 1992). For instance, 
changing norms around diet and exercise might shift the blood pressure distribution in the 
population. Similarly, influencing norms around facemask wearing might alter average 
adherence to facemask recommendations and could have effects on infection transmission at the 
community level. 
 Applied to epidemics, the population strategy targets population parameters that explain 
differences in the incidence of infection or other population characteristics. These are the kinds 
of parameters that appear in a compartment model of the dynamics of an epidemic. In short, the 
population strategy for intervening in an epidemic involves targeting its dynamical population 
parameters. It involves predicting the effect on an epidemic’s dynamics of intervening on a 
population parameter that explains those dynamics. One can predict the effect of such an 
intervention by tweaking only the value of that parameter in a compartment model and observing 




benefit brought by certain changes in the targeted parameter. One can then consider a real-world 
intervention corresponding to the hypothetical intervention they implemented in the 
compartment model. 
 Population-wide vaccination programs illustrate the population strategy for epidemics. 
The theory behind vaccination is to move individuals from the susceptible to the recovered 
compartment, bypassing the pre-infectious and infectious compartments. There are different 
vaccination strategies available to snuff out an epidemic, including vaccinating those exposed to 
the pathogen, those at-risk of serious complications from infection, or the general population 
(Grüne-Yanoff 2018). Often, vaccinating the general population will provide the most population 
benefit in terms of reducing the cumulative incidence of infections by providing the population 
with herd immunity. When a population has sufficient herd immunity, the proportion of the 
population that is susceptible s is too small for the epidemic to grow. Recall the equation for the 
effective reproduction number: Rn = R0 s. When s is less than the inverse of the basic 
reproduction number (s < 1/R0), then Rn is less than 1. When Rn is less than 1, the number of new 
infections decreases. As the number of new infections decreases, the cumulative number of 
infections is lowered and those at risk of complications are statistically protected from infection. 
The point at which s = 1/R0 is called the ‘herd immunity threshold’ and is a conceptual target that 
many mass vaccination campaigns seek to surpass.  
Targeting at-risk or exposed individuals to provide them with individual immunity is the 
high-risk strategy, while targeting s (a dynamical population parameter) to provide the 
population with herd immunity is the population strategy. Mass vaccination illustrates Rose’s 
prevention paradox because it greatly affects population parameters while bringing little 




paradox because herd immunity benefits individuals in the high-risk group whether or not they 
receive the intervention. It thus illustrates that the distinction between the high-risk and 
population strategies is not necessarily about which individuals (higher risk vs. lower risk) are 
benefited by the intervention. 
 An example of the population strategy at work during the COVID-19 pandemic is the use 
of compartment models to predict the influence of social distancing policies on epidemic 
parameters. Imperial College modelers used this approach with their SEIR model to predict the 
effect on incidence and deaths from infection (Walker et al. 2020). We can illustrate the thinking 
with our simpler SEIR model from section 3. Remember from equation 2 that the incidence of 
new infections is driven partly by the effective contact rate β. We can break β down into two 
components via the equation β = mq, where m is the average number of contacts between an 
infectious and a susceptible individual and q is the probability of transmission given contact 
(Vynnycky & White 2010). Social distancing decreases m7 (while mask-wearing decreases q). 
Combing the equations for R0 and Rn introduced in section 3 with the equation for β above, Rn = 
(mqNs)/r. Therefore, decreasing m decreases Rn. In a vivid demonstration of the population 
strategy, based on a retrospective study of social distancing and lockdown measures 
implemented across Europe, the Imperial College researchers concluded: “current interventions 
have been sufficient to drive the reproduction number [Rn] below 1 (probability [Rn] < 1.0 is 
99.9% across all countries we consider) and achieve epidemic control” (Flaxman et al. 2020, 2). 
 The value of the population strategy for epidemics is that it can potentially achieve large 
benefits for the population by greatly altering epidemic dynamics. These dynamics determine the 
                                                          
7 That is, if we define a contact as an interaction in which two individuals come within (say) six feet of one another, 




number of cases, and thus a large number of cases may be averted through changes in dynamical 
population parameters. The strategy can make use of contrastive explanations for the incidence, 
which speaks to the value of those explanations. By explaining a difference in incidence between 
two actual populations, one can often identify fruitful causes on which to intervene to lower the 
incidence in one of those populations. 
 Once again, Rose’s distinction – this time between the population and high-risk strategies 
– invokes a change in perspective rather than different kinds of causes that operate exclusively at 
different levels of decomposition. An intervention cannot effect a change in a population without 
effecting a change in that population’s individuals, assuming supervenience of population 
characteristics on individual characteristics. ‘Targeting a population parameter’ refers to a way 
of conceptualizing or modeling an intervention as intervening on a population parameter; it does 
not invoke a distinction between interventions that affect only the population and interventions 
that affect only the individuals. Nor does the population strategy amount to targeting one set of 
individuals rather than another – the sets of individuals impacted might overlap, sometimes 
greatly. However, the strategies for intervening suggested by these different perspectives may be 
vastly different and have vastly different impacts (which is why these two strategies are non-
redundant). 
 The second central idea behind Rose’s population perspective is the distinction between 
population and high-risk strategies. Rather than as intervening for different individuals, these 
strategies conceptualize the target of intervention differently: the high-risk strategy targets high-
risk individuals, while the population strategy targets population characteristics that explain 
differences in the incidence. In the population strategy for epidemics, the relevant population 







Two central principles for the population perspective in epidemiology are Rose’s distinction 
between the causes of cases and the causes of incidence, as well as his distinction between the 
population strategy and the high-risk strategy of intervention. I argued that the former principle 
should be interpreted as the claim that contrastive causal explanations for the incidence are 
distinct from contrastive causal explanations for the cases. Only sometimes will these 
explanations refer to distinct causes. The latter principle should be understood as a distinction 
between a strategy of targeting high-risk individuals versus one of targeting population 
characteristics that explain differences in the incidence. Rose’s prevention paradox can then be 
seen as trading small benefit with respect to individuals for large benefit with respect to 
population characteristics. The population perspective prefers contrastive explanations for the 
incidence as well as population strategies that target population characteristics. It differs from the 
individual perspective primarily in terms of the level of contrastive causal analysis adopted. 
 Two corresponding principles underlying the population perspective on epidemics are 
that epidemics and infections have distinct contrastive explanations, and that the population 
strategy for intervening in an epidemic involves targeting its dynamical population parameters 
(versus the high-risk strategy of targeting parameters at the level of infections). Under the high-
powered lens of a microsimulation model, an epidemic is a collection of individuals interacting 
to transmit infection from one to another with each infection evolving individually, and our 
interventions can be visualized as disrupting transmission among specific individuals. Under the 




collectively, growing or shrinking at shifting rates, and our interventions can be viewed as 
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